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Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, by Lynn H u n t  
(Berkeley and  Los Angeles: Universi ty of  Cal i fornia  Press, 1984). 
Social interpretations of the French Revolution have been in crisis ever since the 
publication of Alfred Cobban's Social Interpretation o f  the French Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964). Initially the crisis affected only 
the Marxist social interpretation that was Cobban's target, and that he and sub- 
sequent "revisionists," both Anglophone and Francophone, have successfully 
hacked to bits over the past twenty years. But, as Lynn Hunt points out, many 
of the critics themselves accepted the premise that to interpret the revolution 
meant to give "an account of social origins and outcomes" (5). Consequently, 
they have attempted to construct their own alternative social interpretations - 
none of which seems quite satisfactory. In this book, Hunt suggests that we shift 
our angle of vision more radically: that we leave questions of social origins and 
outcomes aside and examine the Revolution as a political process with an essen- 
tially political outcome: "the institution of a dramatically new political culture" 
(15). 
This does not mean that Hunt has turned to old-fashioned political history. In 
fact, readers unfamiliar with the political events of the revolution will not find 
this book easy to follow: there is no exposition of the political phases and strug- 
gles of the revolution; neither the taking of the Bastille nor the insurrection of 
August 10 nor Layfayette nor Mirabeau appear in the text or index. Hunt's book 
is not a political history, but a synoptic essay on the Revolution's transformation 
of politics - both as culture and as social practice. 
She begins with political culture, examining successively revolutionary rhetoric, 
political ritual, and radical imagery. For Hunt, the fundamental feature of the 
French Revolution was that it attempted a total break with the past. Unlike the 
American revolutionaries, who could hearken to the traditional "rights of Eng- 
lishmen" and then to longstanding de facto American independence from the 
corruption of English politics, the French found no viable model in their past. 
Theirs was to be a new nation, founded not on precedents or prejudices but on 
nature and reason alone. They legitimated their revolution in a "mythic present," 
(27) a continually recreated moment of consensus that could no more be fixed 
than could the volatile events of the revolution itself. With all historical land- 
marks gone, with the sacred person of the king desecrated, authority came to rest 
in language itself. As Franqois Furet has argued in Penser la R~volutionfrangaise 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1978) political oower was located not in a class or an institu- 
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tion, but in the claim to speak for an abstract and imaginary single national will. 
The incantatory invocation of nation, patrie, regeneration, or virtue projected 
a community of transparent unified Rousseauian citizens - and also implied as 
their negative counterpart an evil conspiracy of  aristocrats who could only be in- 
fluenced by terror. French revolutionary rhetoric created an inspiring but inher- 
ently unstable model of political community and political action. 
Hunt shows how this combination of exhaltation and suspicion gave rise to an 
unprecedented politicization of  all of  life. Everywhere new political symbolism 
was invented, imposed, and enforced. New forms of political practice - elec- 
tions, demonstrations, festivals, surveillance, insurrection - were elaborated and 
multiplied. Modes of  dress, the vocabulary of  daily life, the reckoning of time, 
space, and quantity: all were to be transformed to create citizens out of slaves. 
Out of  these multifarious practices, which were improvised as the flow of the 
revolution called them forth, a lasting repertoire of republican political tradition 
was fashioned - a repertoire on which the ubiquitous democratic republicanism 
of the modern world is based. Study of  the linguistic and symbolic forms of 
revolutionary practice, Hunt demonstrates, is not merely a curious supplement 
to the study of real politics. Politics itself is symbolically constituted, more obvi- 
ously and self-consciously in the French Revolution than ever before. Close at- 
tention to what she calls "the poetics of power" leads her to the core political 
transformations of the French Revolution. 
This political culture was made and lived by political actors - not only the 
Parisian revolutionary leaders, but thousands of provincials who joined political 
clubs, wrote petitions, made speeches, and held revolutionary political office. 
The second half of  Hunt's book is concerned with the social characteristics of 
what she calls the "new political class" - those who espoused and made a profes- 
sion of the democratic politics of the revolution. Her method in this portion of 
the book is radically different from the literary and symbolic analysis she em- 
ploys to decode political culture. Here she relies above all on quantitative studies 
of regional voting patterns and of the occupational backgrounds of local and na- 
tional office holders. 
She finds that the most radical regions were poor, rural, largely illiterate areas 
in the south-west and center-west. The Parisian basin was consistently right-wing 
and the big cities - Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux, Strasbourg - began on 
the left but had moved to the right by 1795. It was in the socially and geographi- 
cally marginal regions that the new political culture took hold most firmly. She 
also argues that the men who filled the political and administrative posts of the 
revolutionary regimes were marginal. Outsiders of one sort or another were par- 
ticularly attracted by the revolution's radical rejection of all previous political 
practices, because such practices had had no place for them. 
Here Hunt's argument is too loose to be fully convincing. She presents some re- 
vealing anecdotes about genuinely marginal types - actors, recent migrants on 
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the make, or Jews and Protestants who had lacked all civil standing under the 
old regime. But alongside these cases, Hunt's statistics indicate the presence of 
hundreds of merchants, lawyers, shopkeepers, artisans, and, in the villages, sub- 
stantial peasants who became officials of  the revolutionary regimes. These men 
were "marginal" only in the sense that they had been shut out of  political life un- 
der the old regime - not in the sense that Jews and actors were marginal, or that 
poor and illiterate regions of  the south- and center-west were marginal. Nor did 
they constitute a "new political class" in any but the most reduced sense of the 
term "class." The officials of the new regime included a highly diverse collection 
of  literate and moderately comfortable to wealthy citizens, few of  whom had 
been or could have been active in public affairs before 1789. Hunt's "sociology 
of  politics" finds little to distinguish the revolutionary officials from the rest of 
the population - except that the poor and illiterate were scarce, as were nobles 
and former holders of old regime offices. But what these chapters do demon- 
strate is no less important: that thousands of solid citizens of  towns and villages 
all over France gained indelible experience in democratic politics during the de- 
cade of revolution. Their practice of politics was the crucial social basis for the 
formation and perpetuation of the new democratic political culture that Hunt 
describes in the first half of her book. 
In spite of a certain conceptual imprecision in the chapters on the sociology of 
revolutionary politics, Hunt's book develops a convincing argument for the nov- 
elty of  the Revolution. Her insistence that the Revolution must be seen above all 
as a political event, that its crucial product was democratic politics rather than 
bourgeois society or a rationalized state, and that the best way to understand the 
new politics is to examine its linguistic and symbolic matrix, is less original than 
she claims - not only Furet but Mona Ozouf, in La f~te r~volutionnaire, 
1789-1799 (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), made these points before Hunt. Where she 
differs from Furet and Ozouf is in her evaluation of the innovations. Hunt 
celebrates the new politics of the revolutionaries with the straightforward confi- 
dence of  a pragmatic American radical democrat of  the 1960s, while Furet and 
Ozouf retain the wary nervousness of disillusioned French ex-communists of the 
1950s. Hunt's good sense nicely counterbalances the occasional hysteria of  her 
French predecessors, reminding us that, after all, the principal legacy of the 
French Revolution has been democratic politics, not the Gulag. She has fash- 
ioned a thoughtful, distinctive, and provocative interpretation of the French 
Revolution. 
William H. Sewell Jr. 
University of Michigan 
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The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History 
by Rober t  D a r n t o n  (New York: Basic Books ,  1984). 
In The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, 
Robert Darnton again displays the estimable gifts that have earned him a place 
among the finest practitioners of  the historian's craft. His work has always been 
characterized by impressive and detailed archival research, spare and often ele- 
gant prose, and a willingness to confront the critical conceptual and methodo- 
logical issues that underscore his work. The Great Cat Massacre is no exception, 
and in it Darnton engages some of  the most profound questions regarding the 
relation between culture and society. Do ideas and cultural systems reflect eco- 
nomic and social variables? Does everything, in the phrase of  Ernest Labrousse, 
"derive from the curve"? For decades many historians have structured their work 
on the assumption that cultural systems emerge from economic and social varia- 
bles. Perhaps they do, but, as Darnton points out, this assumption may be false, 
because cultural attitudes and ideas have often changed drastically during peri- 
ods of  relative tranquility and remained static during times of  upheaval. 
Obviously Darnton does not seek, nor should we expect him to provide, a defini- 
tive answer to such sweeping questions. In The Great Cat Massacre he offers 
some suggestions for approaching the relation between culture and society and 
applies them to specific episodes in eighteenth-century French history, stating 
clearly that he intends his work to be a trial run, a preliminary attempt to explore 
several ways of  understanding the relation between culture and society. 
The suggestions that Darnton proposes are derived from anthropology. He be- 
lieves that historians must recover the way that ordinary people made sense of 
the world with one particular caveat kept firmly in mind. Exploring the archives 
of  the Old Regime even superficially, Darnton suggests, we will find the early 
modern Frenchmen are different. They do not think, act, or react, the way we 
do or the way we expect them to. They complain about toothaches, tell horrify- 
ing stories, and are obsessed with such things as braiding dung for display on 
manure heaps. We constantly need to be roused from a false sense of security 
about the past, to be administered severe doses of  culture shock. What was 
proverbial wisdom to our ancestors is often completely opaque to us. When we 
encounter this opacity, says Darnton, we have located a valid point of  entry into 
an alien culture and are closer to recovering it. If  this culture can be retrieved, 
Darnton contends, we can stop straining to explain how texts reflect their social 
surroundings because these texts after all were composed and embedded in a 
world that was social and cultural at the same time. 
In The Great Cat Massacre Darnton commences by exploring the lower strata. 
He first elucidates some aspects of  the symbolic world of the peasantry through 
an examination of  its fairy tales and then performs a similar exercise on a group 
of  urban artisans by describing their participation in a brutal massacre of  cats. 
Moving up the social scale in subsequent sections, Darnton examines the world 
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view of an eighteenth-century bourgeois and provides a consideration of several 
aspects of elite culture: the world view of a police inspector, epistemology in a 
key Enlightenment text, and finally, the response of selected readers to Rous- 
seau's La Nouvelle Heloise. 
The essay on the massacre of cats is the central piece of the collection and the 
point where Darnton joins most confidently theory and practice. It therefore 
should be examined with care. Darnton describes the wretched existence of a 
group of apprentices in a Paris print shop. Working long hours at demanding 
tasks, reduced to eating scraps from the master's table (some even rejected by the 
master's cats), the apprentices were relegated to a miserable existence. The ap- 
prentices were further tormented by a horde of alley cats who thrived in the 
printing district and howled all night on the roof above the apprentices' squalid 
quarters, making it impossible for them to get a decent night's sleep. To turn the 
tables on his oppressors, both human and feline, one of the apprentices began 
mimicking the cats' nocturnal antics on the roof outside of the master's bed- 
room. His performance was so convincing that the master ordered the appren- 
tices to get rid of all the cats. The apprentices attended to this task with savage 
zeal. They attacked and clubbed every cat they could find and dumped sackloads 
of half-dead, bludgeoned cats in the courtyard of the print shop. Then, assem- 
bling all the workers, they conducted a mock trial and pronounced the cats 
guilty. After administering the last rites, they strung them up on an improvised 
gallows. At this point, roused by gales of laughter, the master intervened, angry 
only at the stoppage of work. Even he could not dampen the hilarity. For days 
afterward the scene was reenacted whenever the printers wanted to knock off for 
some amusement. 
At this point Darnton believes that he has located opacity, that pivotal point of 
contact with an alien culture. "The whole episode of the cat massacre," he writes, 
"stood out as the most hilarious experience in Jerome's entire career. Yet it strikes 
the modern reader as unfunny, if not downright repulsive. Where is the humor 
in a group of grown men bleating like goats and banging with their tools while 
an adolescent reenacts the ritual slaughter of a defenseless animal? Our own ina- 
bility to get the joke is an indication of the distance that separates us from the 
workers of preindustrial Europe . . . .  Anthropologists have found that the best 
points of entry in an attempt to penetrate an alien culture can be those where 
it seems most opaque. When you realize that you are not getting something that 
is particularly meaningful to the natives, you can see where to grasp a foreign 
system of meaning in order to unravel it" (77-78). 
Darnton admits that we cannot gauge the alienness of Old Regime culture from 
one example, and he is careful to remind us that the cat massacre may have been 
an isolated episode. But in worrying about its representativeness, Darnton has 
failed to perceive a greater problem. Even if we could demonstrate that the inci- 
dent of the cat massacre was fairly representative, we would still not know how 
alien ancien regime culture is. Darnton has assumed that because we would have 
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been appalled by it while the apprentices found it hilarious, we have at last en- 
countered that elusive opacity, the alienness of  earlier culture. This comparison 
of our attitudes with the actions of the apprentices, however, is skewed because 
it is based on the juxtaposition of the intellectual elite of  one culture against the 
lower or "mass" elements of  another. If  we compare the actions of  the harassed 
apprentices with the attitudes of a modern, intellectual elite, say, that of  Prince- 
ton University, naturally the contrast will appear as dramatic as Darnton 
presents it, the alienness as vivid as the presence of  a backwoods hillbilly in one 
of  Darnton's seminars. This contrast is misleading because, first, the cultural 
elite of  the eighteenth century, including Voltaire and Diderot, would also have 
deplored the episode, and, second, we can encounter opacity in our own culture 
as well. 
For example, the city of  Huntington, West Virginia, in which I live, is a university 
town with a sizeable educated and civilized population. One of  the city's prin- 
cipal attractions is a beautiful and elegant park, which serves as a center for fam- 
ily recreation, jogging, tennis, picnics, and other forms of  leisurely activity. But 
the park is also plagued periodically by roving groups of  teenagers, "rednecks," 
and others, who delight in chasing, trapping, torturing, and killing the relatively 
tame and trusting squirrels and chipmunks who also inhabit the park. And these 
people find these activities hilarious. It would be my guess that Huntington is 
by no means exceptional in this regard. Many American cities and rural areas 
have substantial populations of  people who, out of  arrogance, have an inclina- 
tion toward violence, or out of dissatisfaction with some aspect of  their exist- 
ence, lash out at an element of their surroundings. They may go up in a tower 
with a rifle and start blasting, abuse their children, or beat their wives. Or, more 
germane to this inquiry, they may unleash their frustrations in a way that seems 
humorous to them: beating up a homosexual, terrorizing a woman, slashing 
tires, destroying an object or piece of  property prized by someone else, or tor- 
menting an animal. (I am not prepared to explain why some people find these 
things funny, but they do.) At this point opacity loses its reliability as an indica- 
tor of  the alienness of  a past culture because we encounter opacity in our own 
society, and there is no clear way to determine whether one event is more opaque 
to our culture than to its own, or if it is opaque merely to certain segments of  
our culture. Certainly distance exists between "us" (as long as we define our- 
selves as a modern, perhaps more "advanced," intellectual elite) and the workers 
of  pre-industrial Europe, but there is often as much distance between us and ele- 
ments of  our own culture. One persons's opacity may be another's transparency. 
Thus, despite his impressive and thoughtful attempt to probe more deeply into 
the relation between culture and society, Darnton has not succeeded in develop- 
ing a new method for understanding the relation between culture and society. To 
describe an event of  callous violence in one society, however fascinating or even 
representative, and superimpose it against the attitudes of  a high culture of an- 
other society, proves little or nothing. The gap between the brutal and the sub- 
lime seems pronounced in any age. Undoubtedly this gap has been reduced since 
921 
the eighteenth century, but only an investigation of oceanic dimension will tell 
us how much. The Great Cat Massacre may be praised as a valuable and engag- 
ing attempt to understand an alien culture, but Darnton's use of opacity to seek 
that culture places us in a desert looking for an oasis that is not there. 
William Palmer 
Marshall University 
Reading Althusser: A n  Essay on Structural Marxism, Steven B. Smith, 
(Cornell  Universi ty Press, 1984). 
One wants very much to like Steven Smith's introduction to the early work of 
French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. It is, after all, a readable book 
about books that are notoriously unreadable. Furthermore, it does a passable job 
of situating Althusser in the context of French philosophy during the early 
1960s, and attempts throughout to compare Althusser's work with that of other 
writers in the Western Marxist tradition. Finally, despite the fact that he holds 
a view of Marx and Marxism considerably at odds with that of Althusser, Smith 
manages to avoid the obloquy and self-serving polemics that too often character- 
ize Anglo-American discussion of the Althusserian School. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, even-handedness and an accessible style are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions of good criticism and good popularization. In the final analysis, 
Smith's manual is disappointing in several important respects that undermine the 
book's usefulness both as a basic introduction and as a serious critique. 
In the first place, the title is misleading. The book is neither a reading of Althus- 
ser's entire oeuvre, nor an essay on Structural Marxism as a whole, but rather 
a commentary on For Marx and Althusser's contribution to Reading Capital. Of 
course these books are undeniably important, basic texts of the Althusserian 
School, but they are now over twenty years old and have been superseded in 
several key areas by Althusser's own later work as well the work of others. They 
cannot be said to encompass even all of the major themes of Althusser's personal 
writings, let alone the equally important and intimately interconnected work of 
the School as a whole. The central problem for any commentary on Althusser 
is the relation of his early work to his later essays on ideology and philosophy 
(in Lenin and Philosophy and the as yet untranslated Philosophie et Philosopie 
Spontande des Savants), and his own self-criticisms of For Marx and Reading 
Capital (in Essays in Self-Criticism), yet Smith explicitly refuses to take up this 
essential task. His references to Althusser's later writings are sparse and inconse- 
quential. Such a lack of attention is ultimately fatal to any "reading" of Althus- 
ser's early texts, because the changes Althusser later introduced to his view of 
philosophy and the relation between philosophy and science are absolutely fun- 
damental. 
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In For Marx, Althusser attempted to square the philosophical circle by establish- 
ing Marxist philosophy (Dialectiacal Materialism) as the independent arbiter 
and guarantor of  the scientific nature of  Marxist historical practice (Historical 
Materialism). That is to say, he tried to create an epistemology whose 
pronouncements would somehow have the authority of  science. This effort, 
which Althusser later repudiated, confused philosophy with science (for Althus- 
ser science is understood as a conceptual discourse specifying and producing 
knowledge of  a precise theoretical object). While Althusser never retracted this 
conception of  science, he completely relocated it by eliminating the confusion of  
philosophy with science and thereby excluded epistemologicai problems from the 
scientific domain. In his later work, Althusser depicted epistemology as a sterile 
discourse or debate over already existing knowledge (for or against it) rather 
than a scientific discourse productive of knowledge itself. Philosophy, no longer 
the arbiter of  the sciences, became an intermediate discursive field between ideol- 
ogy (the realm of subject-centered discourse) and science (the realm of  object- 
centered discourse). Philosophy became more significant politically as a result 
of this reformulation. Given the highly charged, disruptive effect a science may 
have on the legitimation and reproduction of  existing social relations, Althusser 
began to refer to philosophy as "class struggle in theory." For the later Althusser, 
philosophy can never be innocent or objective. Rather than an "epistemological 
Marxism" (as Smith labels it), Althusser defended a Marxist concept of  episte- 
mology - that science is a social practice, that each science has its own internal 
epistemological criteria, and that these two propositions are being elaborated 
from within Historical Materialism and not from any "independent" philosophi- 
cal perspective. From the point of  view of Althusser's later work, For Marx con- 
stitutes not a philosophical science of  history but rather a philosophical defense 
of  a Marxist history of science. The uninformed reader of Smith's account, how- 
ever, has no way of  knowing this, or of  knowing that the latter's criticisms of 
For Marx are, for the most part, beside the point. 
Smith's selective focus on For Marx and Reading Capital results in another grave 
set of  misleading criticisms and "straw man" arguments with regard to Althusser's 
theory of  ideology. Smith is correct to point out that Althusser tended to use this 
term in different ways for different purposes, but he is not at all clear on what 
those ways were because he has little sense of  the significance of Althusser's later 
work on ideology or how the concept of  ideology figures in the overall 
problematic of  the Althusserian School. In his early work Althusser used ideolo- 
gy to denote (1) a social practice - the domain of social subjects, their constitu- 
tion as subjects, their practice or action as social agents (including the semantic 
aspect of  language); (2) ideology as the "other" of a science - either absolutely 
false (a position discarded along with epistemology), or as a body of  ideas, con- 
cepts, and problems that a science declares to be erroneous as part of  its consti- 
tution as science; and (3) as the "other" of  Marxism - those ideas, concepts, and 
problems that Marxism rejects as erroneous. The key to interpreting Althusser's 
later work (and thus properly assessing For Marx), is to focus on how Althusser 
begins, albeit with considerble hesitation and lack of clarity, to differentiate be- 
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tween these three usages. Ideology in the third sense becomes a philosophical 
category, a position to be combatted to be sure, but one outside the production 
of historical knowledge. Ideology in the second sense becomes a concept of the 
history of science with no relevance to either "truth" or "falsehood." Ideology in 
the first (or "strong") sense, however, continues to be the basic, general concept 
and one of  the basic social practices that, along with economics and politics, 
constitute human social formations, the theoretical object of historical science. 
It is ideology in this most fundamental sense, barely mentioned in For Marx and 
Reading Capital, that dominates Althusser's later work. Because Smith has little 
sense of this, he revives a series of well-known criticisms of For Marx and Read- 
ing Capital - that Althusser divorces theory from practice, that he refuses to 
discuss the relation between science and society, and that he fails to give atten- 
tion to the phenomenon of human experience. Such criticisms are not only "old 
news," they are aimed at straw men. Althusser has always insisted that there is 
no practice (including science) outside the domain of the subject and his concept 
of "interpellation" (the constitution of the human subject by reciprocal relations 
of recognition and regulation) is arguably, in conjunction with the work of Saus- 
sure and Lacan, one of the more interesting theories of  human subjectivity since 
Freud. The Althusserian School (in works by G6ran Therborn, Michel P~cheux, 
and Ernesto Laclau) has elaborated a concept of ideology that purports to ex- 
plain both the enabling power of ideology (the subject as social agent) and its 
power to dominate (the subject as subjugated). Smith gives the concept of inter- 
pellation a single brief mention and fails even to cite the work of Therborn, 
P~cheux, Laclau - or Lacan for that matter in his bibliography. The fact that 
Althusser's theory of  ideology has given rise to an important body of literary 
criticism (by Pierre Macherey, Terry Eagleton, and Ren6e Balibar) will also re- 
main unknown to Smith's readers. 
Equally questionable is Smith's decision to exclude Etienne Balibar's essay "The 
Basic Concepts of  Historical Materialism," which takes up over a third of Read- 
ing Capital (the English translation) and which has had a significant impact on 
both history and anthropology (inspiring works by Pierre-Philippe Rey, Barry 
Hindes and Paul Hirst, Maurice Godelier, and Claude Meillassoux among 
others). In this essay, Balibar attempts to work out the implications of  the early 
Althusserian problematic with respect to problems of historical periodization 
and process and to elaborate the concept of the mode of production. Smith gives 
this seminal essay a mere page devoted exclusively to the definition of mode of 
production, and neglects even to mention that it comes from Balibar and not 
from Althusser himself. 
Once again the problem is more than one of relative neglect. For Balibar, the 
concept of  a mode of production is constituted by three elements (direct 
producers, means of production, and appropriators of surplus value) each dou- 
bly articulated by relations of the labor process and by relations of property. For 
Balibar these elements and relations are invariant concepts but they exist only 
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in their "combination," that is to say, in their historically unique character. Smith, 
however, presents Balibar's concept as if it were analogous to the "abstract for- 
malism" of  I.kvi-Strauss ("the perpetual reshuffling of a fixed pack (of cards)," 
180). This is misleading both as a result of the selective quotation Smith uses to 
support his position (he cites only the first part of  a passage by Althusser that 
goes on to reject the charge of  formalism), but even more so because Smith 
neglects to mention Balibar's explicit refutation of  the charge of  "formalism." 
According to Balibar, there is a radical opposition between his concept of  "com- 
bination" and I.kvi-Strauss's conception of structure, which Balibar labels a 
"combinatory." For Balibar, the Marxist "combination" differs absolutely from 
the structuralist "combinatory" because in the former, the elements are historical- 
ly variable - the nature of the elements themselves is altered by their historically 
specific structure. 
About the real problem of  Balibar's analysis, the tension between structure and 
process, and the later attempts of  the Althusserians to resolve it, Smith has little 
to say. This is unfortunate since the incompatibility of  terms of  structural deter- 
mination and reproduction on the one hand (structural causality, determination 
in the last instance, overdetermination, etc.), and terms of  historical conflict and 
change on the other (contradiction, relative autonomy, class struggle, etc.), is 
surely the major weakness of Reading Capital. 
Similar criticisms might well be made regarding Smith's exclusion of  the political 
theory of Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Therborn, and Laclau (especially curious 
because Smith himself is an assistant professor of  political science). Such a criti- 
cism would be justified if for no other reason than that Smith has chosen to sub- 
title his book an essay on Structural Marxism. However, unlike the previously cit- 
ed work, the political theory has less direct relevance to Smith's chosen subjects, 
For Marx and Reading Capital, and its absence is therefore less important. As 
for the rest, it simply will not do, as Smith attempts, to gainsay his sins of omis- 
sion by means of a disclaimer in a preface. While it is certainly legitimate to fo- 
cus on For Marx and Reading Capital, it is disingenuous, to say the least, to ex- 
clude material that is directly relevant to an adequate, up-to-date understanding 
of these texts. 
If Smith chooses to ignore Althusser's later work as well as the work of the 
Althusserian School as a whole, i t  appears to be to make room for a plethora 
of references to the history of  Western philosophy. Indeed, Smith presents 
Althusser's early work as if it were little more than an eclectic collage of 
philosophers as diverse as Kant, Descartes, Hegel, Parsons, Kuhn, Freud, 
Oakeshott, Merleau-Ponty, Spinoza, Winch, Durkheim, Mannheim, Weber, 
Marx, Wittgenstein, and Bachelard. For Smith, understanding Althusser is less 
a matter of reading than a matter of cross-referencing. Of course this method 
is occasionally illuminating and appropriate (Spinoza, Bachelard, Marx), but 
more often than not it is misleading, calling up a host of associations in the read- 
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er's mind that are real obstacles to understanding the coherence and integrity of 
Althusser's thought. The cross-referencing method can be not only misleading 
(Althusser as a Hegelian, as a functionalist, as a Durkheimian), it is sometimes 
contradictory (Althusser is a neo-Kantian Cartesian on page 98 and a neo- 
Hegelian critic of Kant and Descartes on page 111), and often confusing ("But 
if Althusser has given his Marxism a Durkheimian twist, he has also given his 
Durkheim a Freudian turn," 132). Names that one would expect to find in the 
cross-referencing scheme, names such as Cavaill~s, Lenin, Lacan, Gramsci, Deri- 
da, Mao, are often unaccountably missing, while dubious references to Winch, 
Oakeshott, and others abound. Smith's attempt to use Hegel as an introduction 
to Althusser's view of the autonomy of science (111-114) may make an interest- 
ing point about Hegel, but it shows a surprising ignorance of Althusser's links 
to French philosophy of science (the autonomy of the concept of Cavaill~s), as 
well as surprising indifference to Althusser's deep antipathy to Hegelian philoso- 
phy. Smith comes closer to the mark when he finally cites Spinoza (121), whom 
the Althusserians view as the major philosophical precursor of Marx and the 
original source of whatever insights Hegel may have had. But Smith seems una- 
ware of the important and potentially illuminating relation that the Althusseri- 
ans see between Spinoza and Hegel (the subject of an interesting book by 
Macherey, Hegel ou Spinoza, not cited in Smith's bibliography). 
In summation, despite an engaging style and an admirable clarity of language, 
Smith's book is fatally flawed by errors of omission and commission and by a 
simplicity that on occasion exceeds the bounds set by the task of popularization. 
Even if one were willing to accept all of its faults and self-imposed restrictions, 
there remains an insurmountable gap between the methodological assumptions 
of Reading Althusser and those of Reading Capital. The gulf between the two 
is perhaps too great to be bridged by the synoptic conventions of an introductory 
primer, although I am not convinced of this. Smith's book everywhere lacks a 
sense of the whole of Althusser's work, how each piece fits (or was intended to 
fit) into an overall "problematic." The result is a patchwork organizational struc- 
ture determined not by contours of Althusser's thought but by the exigencies of 
Smith's own traditional view of the history of ideas (which Althusser never 
ceased to deplore). Smith's reading of Althusser shares little with Althusser's 
reading of Marx besides the empty shell of a common verb. 
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